CHAPTER 4

IMPLICATIONS

    Our object ought to be to have a good army rather than a large one.

                         George Washington

                         15 September 1770

4-1. Concept to Reality.

The implications of moving from concept to reality to describe how the Force XXI Army will operate on future battlefields are tremendous, especially given the unpredictable, rapidly changing world environment. The most variable framework in which to address the implications of this future concept is in terms of their impact on TRADOC domains: doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS).

a. Doctrine. Our Army will continue to be a doctrinally based institution. Our Army also has recently changed itself to become a learning organization better suited to the wide variety of requirements for service to nation in a much different strategic environment. Thus, while doctrine will remain the primary means of embodying the Army's ideas on how to think about land operations, a hallmark of American doctrine will be its versatility and adaptability. Consequently, future doctrine will be increasingly influenced by a number of factors, among them changing strategy, developments in human sciences, and information technologies. Information Age technology will have a profound impact on both the doctrinal process and, of course, doctrine itself. For example, the doctrinal implications arising from the command system described in this concept are so great that it will take years for them to be fully understood, let alone developed.

(1) Doctrine will continue to provide a holistic basis for the Army to incorporate new ideas, technologies, and organizational designs. It will also provide the philosophical underpinnings for initiatives designed to help leaders become the adaptive, creative problem-solvers required for future military operations.

(2) The Army's baseline work in evolving a twenty-first century doctrine was the creation of the 1993 version of FM 100-5. That doctrine was designed to address the much broader range of missions facing the Army today. It began our change, shedding our Cold War thinking that was so necessary to victory then, but in need of expansion now. It must serve as a catalyst for change, explaining that change in a language that all soldiers and leaders can fully understand. The major thrust in future doctrine development will be living doctrine based on a fluid, strategic environment, lessons learned from ongoing operations, emergence of new warfighting technologies, and results of simulations and battle lab experimentation.

(3) Simulations and experiments through battle laboratories will continue to serve changing requirements of emerging doctrine, helping Force XXI conduct the critical, doctrinally focused front-end analyses required for new materiel and force design initiatives. As Force XXI refines new ideas and concepts, their doctrinal relevance will be quickly captured in manuals and ultimately­through CD ROM-type (compact disk read-only memory) technology­communicated throughout the Army. Key to this timeliness will be electronic staffing whereby Army learning and combat training centers, major commands, doctrine developers, operational planners, and subject-matter experts will form an internetted system for the development of relevant doctrine.

(4) Versatility will be a key characteristic of future doctrine. With the advent of wider roles and missions in the future, Force XXI will have to interface with other services, foreign forces, government, and even nongovernment agencies in doctrine development. The critical importance of developing doctrine for multinational operations­tailored for traditional allies and even likely coalition partners­will require command emphasis. The expanding scope and unpredictable nature of future military operations make doctrinal initiatives along these lines essential for success in war and OOTW.

(5) The greatest intellectual challenge confronting the Army today is maintaining its doctrinal relevance. This concept addresses how Force XXI will fight future wars that are the historical descendants of the past: World War II, Korea, and even Desert Storm. The Army, the Nation, and its other armed forces must resolve how to use all elements of national power under other conditions­those in which we will operate more frequently, such as recent operations in Somalia and the current situation in the Balkans.

(6) Doctrine will remain the engine of change for Force XXI­America's twenty- first century Army. Doctrine will drive change in training, equipment, and organizational requirements because it will reflect a sound, proven conceptual foundation for growth. Progressive, timely, relevant, realistic, and flexible doctrine will prove critical to success on future battlefields and noncombat areas of operation.

b. Training. Training in support of future full-dimensional operations will cause the Force XXI to realign the three pillars­institutional, unit, and self-development­of the Army training system. The integration of those three training strategies will yield more fully a seamless future training strategy for every soldier and unit. The future training strategy will continue to be task-based trained to a standard under varying conditions. All training executed in the institution and in the unit or by the individual soldier will directly contribute improved soldier, leader, and unit mission readiness.

(1) Several trends and factors will influence what Force XXI trains, how it trains, when it trains and where. Although the downward trend in the size of the force will stabilize toward the end of the century, the Army, as well as the other services, will be smaller than the one that served our Nation well through the early 1990s. The world continues to be an unstable and dangerous place facing various threats with a wide range of military, economic, and technological capabilities. DOD will continue to focus on maintaining its technological advantage over these varying threats. Many scenarios in which soldiers will be employed cover the full range of military operations, but virtually all will involve joint operations and most, particularly in OOTW, will be combined. Environmental constraints and reduced training funds will further limit large- scale field exercises.

(2) This smaller, more lethal, more flexible Army must ensure that what it trains will contribute to the wider variety of missions in which it might be employed. It is essential that new soldiers at all levels be instilled with the warrior ethos. That part of institutional training must remain constant. We will examine and modify the current mix of institutional and unit training. This will impact the total Army and result in modified mobilization training strategies. The smaller force will have fewer individual specialties for both officers and enlisted soldiers. Training in the various levels of joint operations will occur earlier in a soldier's career. Units will continue to concentrate their training on mission-essential task lists (METL); however, elements of that will change to meet diverse future combat and OOTW scenarios. Regional orientation will not be possible for active component units but it will be for early deploying reserve component units.

(3) Major changes will occur in how Force XXI is able to train. This will lead to the merging of individual, unit and self-development parts into the seamless Army training system. For a variety of reasons, the number of installations on which traditional institutional training takes place will decrease as will the number of installations on which major (battalion level and above) field exercises will occur. However, these installations will be internetted and interconnected to facilitate both individual and collective training at all levels. Individual skill training refreshers and sustainment will be available to each soldier. Data bases will be available to the soldier routinely to address lessons learned from previous operations, worldwide political and demographic information, or expert individual specialty training requirements. It will be a classroom without walls. The capability to interconnect virtual live and constructive simulations for unit training across the full range of military operations will be necessary and must be embedded in our equipment. Distributed interactive simulations will tie geographically dispersed units together for training and actual mission rehearsal. This capability will be required to be joint and often combined. However, the essence of land combat is control achieved by operations on a variety of terrain. Thus, for units at battalion and below where teamwork skills are rapidly perishable, especially for the higher tempo Force XXI operations, continuous field environment training, especially at combat training centers, is essential. This is so because it is in our combat training centers that soldiers, leaders, and units experience a realistic, tough battle scenario that requires synchronized execution at all levels. This must continue.

(4) The result of all these factors of change is an Army training system that is a seamless integration of individual, unit, and self-development training that focuses on essential tasks throughout the soldier's career. Yet our Nation's land warfare and OOTW readiness will continue to require a sustained commitment to excellence in training in units and in our land warfare university.

c. Leader Development. The Army's future leaders will be fundamentally competent and have the necessary intuitive sense of operational units and soldiers. Force XXI will have a higher leader-to-led ratio. Leaders will have a keen awareness of the world and know the role of military force in that world. Future leaders will have a broader understanding of war and the art of command. For example, in their professional development, they will be exposed to ideas on military art and science that go beyond traditional models and the views of primarily Western theorists.

(1) Future leaders must understand the changing nature of the legitimacy of command authority. While position and rank, along with accumulated and demonstrated wisdom and judgment, will still provide command authority, authority gained heretofore by possession of more information will change. Leaders must exploit the potential to be found in military organizations that are flatter, internetted, and where quality soldiers with expanded and timely information are able to reach their full potential for initiative and action within the overall intent when given that opportunity.

(2) Future Army leaders must be able to fully exploit the opportunities that command systems, such as the one described herein, provide. They cannot use these systems to second-guess or interfere with the command prerogatives of subordinate commanders. They must have such intuitive skills as vision, innovation, adaptability, and creativity and the ability to simplify complexities and clarify ambiguities­all while operating under stress.

(3) Leaders will be schooled in joint and multinational operations and skilled in synchronizing and harmonizing all aspects of combat and noncombat operations. Future leaders will have a higher level of doctrine-based skills, knowledge, attitudes, and experience to apply the battlefield operating systems to a wider range of complex contingency missions. In fact, the complex nature of future operations may require leaders of greater experience and rank commanding at lower levels than ever before. Regardless of experience or rank, all future leaders will be called upon to make rapid, doctrinally sound decisions as they plan and execute missions in more diverse, high- pressure operational environments. Tactical-level leaders, for example, must be prepared to make decisions, such as those involving rules of engagement and others that may have major strategic consequence, under the scrutiny of the international media.

(4) The Army's leader development initiatives will provide steady development of individuals who demonstrate potential for mastering the art of command. Institutions and commanders will train and develop leaders who are intuitive, agile-minded, innovative, and disciplined. Leaders will be schooled and skilled in the following:

(a) Planning and executing independent operations within the commander’s intent­characterized by showing versatility and initiative, taking calculated risks, and exploiting opportunities.

(b) Developing and using detailed, understandable, flexible operations plans­characterized by communicating the intent orally, visually, and in writing while providing purpose, direction, and motivation.

(c) Combining and using technology with a human dimension­characterized by tactical and technical competence and consistent building of cohesive teams.

(5) Leaders will be trained and developed under conditions that approximate projected operational environments and will encounter conditions that frequently change and become progressively more difficult.

(6) Performance standards will include requirements for leaders to­

(a) Rapidly grasp changes in situations and conditions.

(b) Exercise initiative by independently planning.

(c) Execute doctrine-based actions (within the commander's intent) that maintain a steady focus on accomplishing the assigned operational mission.

d. Organizations. The future Army will be smaller, yet have new, expanded, and diverse missions in an unpredictable, rapidly changing world environment. These factors mandate change to the way we organize. First, it is essential that we be able to rapidly tailor organizations for operations. Second, we must organize around information processing and dissemination. Third, leader-to-led ratio must change and be flexible for specific missions. Likewise, staffs may not be constant in size, but be tailorable to the mission. Fourth, we must organize around the division as the major tactical formation with the capability to tailor it for specific mission purposes. Fifth, combat support and combat service support must be modular, then capable of task-organizing for the mission. Future organizational design will capitalize on the full range of mission capabilities available in the Total Force structure, leading to the success that is essential for knowledge-based operation. These Force XXI units led by innovative commanders more than likely will be modular in design, allowing the rapid tailoring of units to operate within any potential contingency situation in joint and multinational operations. Based on these factors, experimentation in organizational design, along with technological advances, materiel, and supporting operational concepts, will be essential to evaluate and refine the future concepts of the type described herein. For example, objectives such as sensor-to-shooter links will drive changes in our approach to fire support and, in turn, the organizations that provide and coordinate fires. The logistics demands of future force-projection operations call for a reassessment of existing combat and combat support structures as well as a determination of the relevance or utility of some branches/corps.

(1) All Army forces must be rapidly deployable, highly survivable, lethal, agile, mobile, modular in design, and equipped to respond to the full range of military operations. Forces must be designed to enable rapid but flexible transition from War to OOTW or vice versa. The commander must be given the assets to include flexible, versatile organizations to dominate battlespace. Commanders must have the capability to rapidly assemble, deploy, and employ a force with the required mix of capabilities. They must be provided the assets to dominate battlespace.

(2) As mentioned earlier, digitization of the battlefield and other advances in information technology will result in smaller staffs and highly mobile command posts at all levels of command. Even though staffs will be generally smaller, new information technologies will allow them to perform more functions. Organizations at lower levels will be able to perform joint and multiservice functions previously conducted at much higher levels. In essence, functions at all organizational levels must be reevaluated.

(3) Given advances in direct- and indirect-fire capabilities, versatile organizations must be designed to optimize the mix between these capabilities and exploit enhanced target-acquisition capabilities.

(4) Organizational design must maximize the use of technologies that will allow functions to be performed on a remote stationary location. Organizational designers will use technological advances to decrease the size of units while expanding lethality, survivability, and deployability. Home or remote stationary capabilities will reduce deployability requirements, provide for continuity of operations, and reduce personnel requirements through versatile/multiple use of stationary assets.

(5) A smaller Army will require augmentation of nonmilitary personnel to perform some functions. Organizations must be trained and manned for augmentation and support by DA/DOD civilians and civilian contractors.

(6) Logistics organizations must be modular, tailorable, and flexible to sustain future Army operations. Organizational design must facilitate operations in a split-based or offset configuration and employ Information Age technologies to produce the optimum seamless soldier and weapon support system.

(7) The success of Force XXI operations will depend on spectrum supremacy. As a result, future organizational design must consider increased use of electronic and directed-energy warfare. More activity in the electromagnetic spectrum will result in new staff functions and possibly organizations to manage those operations.

(8) Future operations will be joint, often combined, and frequently interagency or with nongovernment organizations. A structure should exist at the appropriate level to properly coordinate staff actions among agencies, services, and coalitions, instead of organizing ad hoc to accomplish the missions.

(9) The likely propensity for many OOTW and the current makeup of the active component and reserve components should be reviewed. Although we envision achieving success in OOTW through training, the possibility of tailoring forces based on unique requirements of OOTW should be explored.

e. Materiel. A force-projection Army must be versatile, lethal, deployable, sustainable, and capable of victory in our Nation's Wars and OOTW. It must be responsive to meet the challenges of full-dimensional operations.

(1) The materiel requirements to support this emerging warfighting concept are both revolutionary and evolutionary. The future materiel capabilities described herein will be driven by leveraging technologies that are horizontally integrated into weapons systems and platforms.

(2) The effects of a smaller Army will demand use of highly technical systems that will increase battlefield tempo, lethality, and survivability. Materiel enhancements, upgrades, research, and development must focus on the capabilities to meet the following:

(a) The force-projection Army must be able to quickly project lethal and survivable combat power­across the range of military operations­around the globe. Essential tenets to execute this requirement will drive new and improved strategic lift and sustainment capabilities. The ability to develop or stage pre-positioned equipment (afloat and land-based) in configurations to support early entry and follow-on forces will prove critical. Emphasis must be on designing, developing, and procuring weapons systems, platforms, support equipment, and sustaining equipment that is light, durable, and multipurpose, with significantly smaller footprint­weight and cube­to meet mobility requirements. Embedded technologies will increase the availability, reliability, and maintainability of systems that support extended logistical lines.

(b) Improved intelligence and advanced information systems, along with high-technology weapons, will greatly expand the battlespace of future maneuver formations. The use of deep-precision strike weapons, sensors, brilliant munitions, and smart weapons will allow combat forces to apply overwhelming firepower within their battlespace.

(c) Future battlefield capabilities required to enhance survivability and protection include­

1. Low observables.

2. Lightweight armor packages.

3. Munitions that are insensitive to detonation.

4. Multipurpose sensors.

5. Combat-vehicle-mounted contamination avoidance detectors.

6. Soldier protection suits with support systems.

7. Active protection systems able to provide joint defenses of selected tactical platforms/C3 nodes against direct and indirect fires, as well as area defenses against a wide range of munitions, especially weapons of mass destruction. As described, the empty battlefield phenomena will continue. The nature of highly dispersed future battle requires an integrated soldier system that provides personal communications, navigation, location-monitoring, protection, and digital linkages to supporting weapons systems.

(d) Split-based operations, total asset visibility, telemetry to allow anticipation of requirements, containerization, automation, and assured communications will provide flexible, prompt, and efficient sustainment on future battlefields. Increases in system reliability and modular packaging of repair parts and other classes of supplies will be based upon METT-T. The development of a capability for remotely operated, teleoperated, and autonomous robotic ground vehicles to perform a variety of missions will increase force sustainment. These operations include acquisition, refueling, rearming, supply distribution, materials handling, environmental sensing, and route planning.

(e) Future operations will rely greatly upon space-based intelligence and communications system. Satellites backed up by wide-band terrestrial means will be significant, providing a capability to pass greatly increased quantities of data. Requirements also exist to possess electronic warfare protection features, antisatellite capabilities, and amplified electronic warfare attack and protection systems. The future battlefield will require the capability to assess enemy strength, location, and movement over wide areas; to communicate with and coordinate forces over great distances; to accurately position friendly ground forces; and to acquire the targets and guide weapons to those targets far beyond the forward trace of troops of a routine operation. Space systems will provide surveillance, communications, weather environmental contamination and terrain data, and positioning and targeting capabilities that will give tactical commanders at all levels a comprehensive knowledge of the battlefield.

(f) Future research and development efforts will enable the following capabilities:

1. Microelectronics and related technologies must be pursued for signal acquisition, communication, computation, and processing. Control of nanoscale processes will significantly reduce the size and increase the capabilities of future computers, enabling increasingly sophisticated computer capabilities at lower echelons of employment. The capabilities of these technologies establish the limits of performance for smart weapons, future fire control systems, warning receivers, electronic operations, and intelligence collection materiel.

2. Brilliant systems are the trend, not brilliant munitions. These systems will be capable of indirectly firing, discriminating between friendly and enemy targets, and seeking and destroying prioritized enemy targets autonomously. Systems must be as smart as our soldiers if we are to realize the full potential of quality soldiers on Force XXI operations. These systems require a full understanding of the complex interaction of targets, sensors, processing hardware, architectures, and algorithms. As stated in the concept, artificial intelligence can be applied to significantly improve Army battlefield management, intelligence analysis and data support, autonomous weapons and vehicles, prognostics and diagnostics for equipment maintenance, real-time diagnoses of soldiers' physical conditions, troop training, and logistical inventory control.

3. Advance propulsion technology is required to enhance the range of future munitions. Advanced vehicle propulsion will provide enhanced vehicle mobility and will significantly reduce energy consumption.

4. Robotic capabilities are required to reduce hazards to personnel; perform rapid, accurate manipulations; and perform tasks impossible for humans. A coordinated variety of unmanned aerial vehicles and robotics will significantly leverage the deployed force.

5. Tactical power sources based upon vastly improved battery/energy storage technologies and microminiature power generation will significantly increase the duration, dependability, and economy of power sources.

6. Molecular engineering will enable stronger, lighter advanced materials for a wide range of systems applications. Bioproduction and bimolecular engineering will provide the force with enhanced detection and protection from chemical and biological agents.

(g) Continuous advancements in technology will provide not only leap- ahead materiel to support execution of knowledge-based operations but serve to maintain the economic development of the Nation's industrial base. The execution of knowledge- based operations will require considerable attention to maintain the Army's technological edge on the future battlefield. The defense industrial base is undergoing significant downsizing. Refocusing the industrial base planning process will be necessary to change from a near-term and midterm broad approach to one that examines the feasibility and producibility of essential warfighting technologies. This will require concentration of efforts on preserving the few and unique strategic technologies and production processes that are most vital to the warfighting requirements of Force XXI, for example, microelectronics, robotics, advanced propulsion, and molecular engineering. To meet and hopefully preserve industry's capability to provide the necessary advanced technologies and materiel developments necessary to conduct operations as described in this concept will depend solely upon a joint effort between the Army, industry, and academia to identify essential technologies against required warfighting capabilities.

f. Soldiers. Quality soldiers, trained and led by competent and caring leaders, will remain key to success on future battlefields. Soldiers in the twenty-first century will be faced with a wide variety of challenges in preparing for and executing missions in full- dimensional operations. They will be trained on selected critical individual tasks in initial entry training to ensure they are immediately deployable upon joining their first unit. They will be familiar with the wide variety of tasks expected of them and the equipment they will use. This concept seeks to empower and develop the untapped potential of our quality soldiers. The battlefield contribution of individual quality soldiers will continue to increase and, indeed, is at the root of knowledge-based operations.

(1) Increased flexibility and adaptability will be required at all levels. Force XXI will also increase the demand for soldiers with a second language. Training and leader development will focus on preparing junior officer and noncommissioned officer leaders for vastly increased responsibility at a much lower rank and earlier in their careers than is the case today.

(2) Soldiers will be exposed to a wide diversity of operations in different geographical environments, often on short notice. Soldiers' equipment will be designed for these realities. Individuals will be equipped with personal protection systems and communications and weapons systems that will allow them to respond instantly to the chain of command and to rapidly changing situations. Human science will greatly improve soldier training and education as well as individual physical and mental readiness in preparation for the rigors of the high-tempo, high-technology operations described herein.

g. Integration.

(1) Momentous changes in the global environment, National Security Strategy, scope of military operations, and force structure, coupled with the rapid pace of technology, will have a profound impact on development and promulgation of future Army required capabilities. The Army must consider these changes as well as the impact of joint and multinational/interagency existing or required capabilities on the integration and prioritization of the Army's DTLOMS requirements.

(2) The Army must design new or exploit existing processes and fix responsibility for ensuring horizontal and vertical integration of DTLOMS requirements, which will ensure the fielding of capabilities that allow it to perform its diverse and growing mission responsibilities.

4-2. Summary.

a. The next several decades will continue to present both challenges and opportunities for the Army in service to the Nation. Our Army will remain a strategic force capable of decisive victory. While surrounded by a storm of global, geostrategic, economic, and societal changes, the Army is experiencing a revolution in military affairs. This revolution demands a broader understanding of the future world, conflict, and the role played by military force and forces. Recognizing the wide variety of potential adversaries Force XXI may be called upon to fight, the scope of military operations it must be able to conduct, and the different political and geographic environments in which it will serve requires our expanding understanding of war. On one hand, Force XXI must be prepared to conduct quick, decisive, highly sophisticated operations; while on the other, it must be ready to execute limited, often protracted operations against low-technology enemies.

b. With this challenge comes the recognition that in order to remain relevant to the world as it is­and how we think it may evolve­the Army must continue the process of change, continuity, and growth it has experienced in recent years. Our Army since 1989 has evolved to become a learning organization. This idea allows our Army to assimilate growth much more rapidly even while conducting current operations. Force XXI is a concept for a learning organization. It calls for major philosophical, theoretical, materiel, and organizational changes­from how we think about war, to how we fight and lead on future battlefields and succeed in OOTW. The idea, for example, of achieving force coherence on future battlefields through shared knowledge versus physical means such as formations, matrixes, or often restrictive battlefield geometry is a bold departure from the past, yet clearly within the capabilities of our Army as a learning organization to put into practice. The total Army must also adapt to having an increasing number of its operational capabilities in other components of the force, which will increase the demands on our civilians and our citizen soldiers.

c. Mastering the challenges of growth is never easy. Force XXI Operations call for frank assessments on where we are as an army and where we need to go­tough decisions. They will continue to require a long-term sustained commitment to excellence to develop the leaders, soldiers, equipment, and organizations capable of executing the types of operations described herein. The Army has met similar challenges in the past and will master those of the future. As it has for the latter half of the twentieth century, our Army will move into the twenty-first century as the world's preeminent land fighting force.

d. Core values, ethics, doctrinal bedrock, and moral principles will remain as the glue that binds the Army together. Its proud history gives it the strength of conviction and purpose­change, continuity, and growth.

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