CHAPTER 3

FUTURE LAND OPERATIONS

           The circumstances of war are sensed better than
they are explained.

           Maurice de Saxe 

3-1. Force XXI - The Strategic Army.

This chapter is in three parts. The first describes the unifying concept of Force XXI around five characteristics. The second describes changes in each of the battle dynamics consistent with those characteristics. Finally, these two parts are brought together to describe actual Force XXI Operations.

a. The future Army Force XXI must be prepared to face the full spectrum of operational environments described in Chapter 2. Therefore, our Army must design organizations and develop capabilities that will allow it to be rapidly tailorable, rapidly expansible, strategically deployable, and effectively employable as part of a joint and multinational team to achieve decisive results in future War and OOTW in all operational environments. Force XXI must exploit reserve component capabilities, especially in strategic mobility, sustainment at all levels, and early entry. Force XXI is defined by five characteristics: doctrinal flexibility, strategic mobility, tailorability and modularity, joint and multinational connectivity, and the versatility to function in War and OOTW.

(1) Doctrinal Flexibility. Clearly, the future strategic landscape will be varied and multifaceted and have a great potential for surprise across the operational spectrum. In addition, future adversaries may possess technology equal to or, in some cases, superior to our own. Thus, we have begun a course for doctrine in 1993 and continue with this concept based on the battle dynamics that depend on, indeed demand, that leaders have the skill to apply those principles in ways as varied as scenarios presented. At the center of this flexible doctrine are our quality leaders and soldiers. Practiced in application of principles in varied scenarios, our soldiers and leaders will be able to continually adapt tactics, techniques, procedures, and organizations to meet future requirements. We call these Force XXI Operations, and they are described in paragraph 3-3.

(2) Strategic Mobility. Strategic mobility is about being at the right place at the right time with the right capabilities. It is about a combination of anticipation, movement, and skillful pre-positioning. Lethality and survivability of early entry forces will continue to be a main focus. Making forces lighter and able to reach deeper, while not sacrificing lethality and survivability, also is required. In addition, initiatives should concentrate on those parts of mobility capable of improvement through use of new information systems, split-based operations and broadcast intelligence, or information concerning other battlefield functions. Shared knowledge will improve deployability through smaller, more precise tailoring of combat units and support requirements to accomplish the wide variety of missions expected of our force-projection Army. A force- projection Army will devote much energy toward the synergy to be gained from actual rapid movement of lethal and survivable early entry forces, increasing the ability to lift these forces by increasing strategic lift capability through investment in sealift, airlift, pre-positioning, and infrastructure improvements and by measures to assist in anticipating possible commitments.

(3) Tailorability and Modularity. Aided by information technology, organizations will tend to grow flatter and less rigidly hierarchical. Strategic lift limitations, other service capabilities, time limits, and other factors may compel the Army to use only those forces absolutely necessary. Limits also exist on the number and types of units in the Army. These factors will demand forces that are as modular as logic allows to facilitate tailoring to meet each contingency.

(4) Joint, Multinational, and Interagency Connectivity. The Army must continue to improve its contribution to joint and interagency operations. To fully execute full-dimensional operations throughout the depth, height, width, and time of the particular battlespace demands use of other service assets. The Army is obviously dependent upon other services for strategic lift. Conversely, the Army provides many unique capabilities on land and at ports and airfields that other services cannot provide for themselves. Beyond joint connectivity, in addition to promoting interservice cooperation, Army battle command capabilities must facilitate use of various Army headquarters as efficient joint force command mechanisms. Political and military considerations require that most operations, both in War and OOTW, will be multinational and multiagency and involve nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs). Obviously, great divergence in capabilities will be present in all such operations. When forming coalitions, U.S. forces will likely provide certain capabilities they alone possess, such as strategic lift, battle command, strategic intelligence, and sustainment capabilities. Depending upon the location of operations and political factors, partner nations may provide greater numbers of troops to the coalition than the U.S. Liaison requirements will logically increase in quantity and complexity, to include greater need for linguistic knowledge and cultural awareness.

(5) Versatility in War and OOTW. The Nation cannot afford to maintain an army of armies in the early twenty-first century. The requirement to be trained and ready to win the land battle remains the absolute priority. Well-trained and disciplined units, provided with sufficient time and resources to train, can transition to OOTW missions as required.

b. Quality soldiers and information will be the key to fully developing these characteristics of Force XXI and will significantly impact all aspects of the Army. The main imperative guiding future operations, from full war to domestic support operations, will be to gain information and continued accurate and timely shared perceptions of the battlespace. Soldiers and information­the centerpieces of future operations are critical in that they permit changes in the dimensions of the battlespace and potentially dominate the battlespace through different combinations of maneuver, fires, and information operations. By mastering information, we can potentially command operations at an operational tempo no potential enemy can match. As we develop our mastery of such operations, however, we must develop the protection of these systems and procedures even more rapidly.

c. Information will allow the conduct of future full-dimensional operations by informing units­perhaps even enemy units, to convince them to surrender of the full effect of all actions throughout the depth, height, width, and time of the battlespace. Such information will allow greater synchronization of effort, control of tempo, and control of force application.

d. Changes in the battle dynamics, especially in areas influenced by information technology, strategic mobility, and precision munitions, will enable Force XXI Operations to have the characteristics described in this chapter. Enablers, such as doctrine, leaders, soldiers, technology, and information, will give Force XXI the means to achieve a qualitative edge in operations and produce overwhelming, decisive, effects-oriented power. Overwhelming, decisive power is not solely firepower. For example, in OOTW, it may be food delivered to starving civilians or a demonstration of joint military capability so decisive that an adversary modifies its behavior to meet friendly goals. Regardless, U.S. force capabilities will define the battlespace, regulate tempo, ensure initiative, and promote quick, decisive operations with the minimum force necessary.

3-2. Meeting The Challenge - The Battle Dynamics.

As previously described, recent operations have given us a glimpse of the nature of future warfare. This glimpse has evolved into what we have named battle dynamics. These battle dynamics give us a framework to describe change and to begin our experimentation with hypotheses that predict outcomes to be confirmed in such experiments. These experiences, combined with our understanding of the evolving strategic environment and the emerging National Security Strategy, help shape our vision of early twenty-first century American military operations. Two key elements permeate all the battle dynamics. The first is that in future joint land operations, force coherence and thus application of combat power can be achieved through shared knowledge of battlefield conditions versus traditional physical control means such as graphic control measures or geographical demarkation of areas of operations. The second element is our quality soldiers and their noncommissioned and officer leaders, trained and developed through education and training in our land warfare university. A description of the first principle of each of the battle dynamics­operational manifestations of the Force XXI characteristics follows.

a. Battle Command. Battle command is the art of decision-making, leading, and motivating informed soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish missions at the least cost to soldiers. Characteristics of recent operations reinforce the notion that the ambiguities and complexities of future combat require even greater leadership skills and a shift in focus from the positioning of forces to the art of orchestrating the effects of those forces. With this shift, the roles of the commander and soldiers will gain even greater importance.

(1) Future battle command starts with competent commanders and noncommissioned officer leaders who have developed an intuitive sense of battle gained from study and experience. These leaders must demonstrate the ability to successfully command in a variety of missions, operational circumstances, and geographic environments. It also starts with quality soldiers at the center­soldiers with initiative, soldiers who contribute to the overall intent far in excess of their numbers because they are continuously informed. Despite advances in information technology, commanders, leaders, and soldiers will never have perfect knowledge of the operational situation surrounding them. Yet, due to the pace and complexity of future battle, commanders, more so than in the past, must accept uncertainty and not hesitate to act instead of waiting for more analysis or information. Commanders will frequently call upon intuitive skills gained from study and practice to bridge the gap and assist such actions. In addition, better informed soldiers, caused by better information distribution, will significantly add to this capability to act and to sustain the needed tempo. Yet, as they have in the past, commanders will still have to be with soldiers, to feel their pride and their pain, to listen, then to decide and act at the least cost to them.

(2) As described in Chapter 2, the ability to move information rapidly and to process it will likely change the way we command military operations. It will greatly influence force organization, command procedures, and staff systems. The Army's vision of future battle command is reflected in the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) concept. This system capitalizes on the power of our quality soldiers, enabled by what we now call Information-Age technology. It recognizes the inevitable coexistence of both hierarchical and nonhierarchical, or internetted, information processes. In the concept, the ABCS and software will use broadcast battlefield information, as well as information from other sources, and integrate that information, including real-time friendly and enemy situations, into a digitized image that can be displayed graphically in increasingly mobile and heads-up displays. These images will, in essence, depict a unit's actual battlespace. Collective unit images will form a battlespace framework based on shared, real-time awareness of the arrangement of forces in the battlespace, versus a rigid framework of battlefield geometry­phase lines, objectives, and battle positions. This system permits commanders at every level to share a common, relevant picture of the battlefield scaled to their level of interest and tailored to their special needs. Simultaneously, commanders at the same echelon will have a shared perspective of their position in relation to adjacent units. Maneuver, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) leaders, horizontally linked by common information, will, for the first time, have a means to visualize how they will execute in harmony, integrated by a shared vision of the battlespace. Individual soldiers will be empowered for independent action because of enhanced situational awareness, digital control, and a common view of what needs to be done. See Figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1

ABCS Digitized Reflection of Unit Battlespace

(3) This common picture will greatly enhance force-level dominance by enhancing situational awareness and ensuring rapid, clear communication of orders and intent, potentially reducing the confusion, fog, and friction of battle. As described earlier, the ABCS will include both hierarchical and internetted processes. For example, key force-level control orders normally associated with direct application of combat power will likely remain in the hierarchical domain. Information on services or other activities, including logistics, movement control, air defense warning, intelligence, and other areas can be readily accessed through pull-down information carousels (a nonhierarchical format). Some battlefield functions, fire support for example, will be exercised through both means. Above all, the future battle command system will be a commander's and soldier's system. It will be designed for command on the move. It will recognize the importance of the commander's personal presence on the battlefield, so essential to inspiring and motivating subordinates. Additionally, it will recognize the expected contribution and initiative of better-informed soldiers, capable of individual action within the overall command intent. Such shared information, where, in some cases, subordinates have as much information as commanders, changes the dynamics of leader- to-led in ways yet to be fully explored and exploited.

(4) Internetted information will greatly enhance all battle operating systems with the greatest potential payoff in intelligence, operations, and fire support functions. Rapid distribution of information such as broadcast intelligence is critical to all unit levels. Combatants can often directly coordinate their actions better through shared situational awareness than a higher headquarters can by directive command. Higher echelons will monitor lower nets, allow subordinates to fight the close fight, and concentrate on influencing the remainder of the battlespace in depth, height, width, or time.

(5) Hierarchy and structure in an organization should not be confused with process. Processes are the means by which organizations act to accomplish a task. It is possible, therefore, to have a well-structured organization that is highly agile because of processes used. One great value of such a flatter organization is its increased versatility. The challenge is to define core processes, possibly the operating systems defined in the Blueprint of the Battlefield (TRADOC Pam 11-9), and find the most efficient ways to accomplish the process across branch and service boundaries. See Figure 3-2.

(6) Advanced Army and joint intelligence systems that feed into ABCS will enable commanders to detect and track enemy forces throughout a given battlespace. This capability presents new challenges because information about enemy posture, position, and activity will be known earlier and in far greater detail than ever before. For example, before the ultimate intent of an enemy force can be determined, the benefits versus the risks of early attack with limited inventories of long-range precision weapons must be carefully analyzed.

(7) The existence of these advanced intelligence systems will not, however, replace soldiers. Soldiers will remain our greatest intelligence source, especially in OOTW; hence, one of the reasons for the manpower-intensive characteristics of OOTW. Information provided by soldiers must be integrated to confirm, corroborate, or deny the digitally portrayed common picture. Commanders accessing intelligence data bases will have greater access to, and place greater reliance on, the counsel of civil affairs, PSYOP, and other SOF assets. Human intelligence will often remain the only source of reliable information about the enemy, even on the highly technical battlespace of tomorrow.

(8) Friendly force situational awareness will be brought about by the digitization of each weapons platform and potentially each soldier so that commanders will know where every fighting system is in the heavy force and where every soldier is in the light force. This enhanced situational awareness will build confidence and agility into the maneuver of both mounted and dismounted elements. It will not, however, eliminate the necessity for standard drills, tactics, techniques, and procedures throughout the force.

(9) This future command system is obviously predicated upon our exercising spectrum supremacy­a key element of information operations. While control of the entire electromagnetic spectrum is impossible, key portions must be commanded most of the time. Our use of information as the focus of operations will be a strength but could also easily become an Achilles' Heel. Protection of friendly information systems from myriad threats, while denying the enemy use of his systems, will be absolutely critical. In the future, full-dimensional information operations must be fully integrated into the planning, preparation, and rehearsal for every operation. Commanders must be personally involved in determining the vital role all aspects of information operations can play in the successful execution of military operations in war and OOTW.

Figure 3-2

Coexistence of Hierarchical and Internetted Processes

(10) Future information technology will provide the means to collect, process, disseminate, and display information in an unparalleled manner. As stated earlier, this technology may revolutionize our approach to battle command. Yet the commander brings the requisite ability, experience, and wisdom to convert information to battlespace knowledge. The commander and small staff can access all desired information on a certain region, adversary, or ally. The commander or his staff will tailor the request to the immediate need and thus eliminate the slow process of combing through a broad intelligence product prepared at higher echelons to answer all needs. This fusion of intelligence architecture is already being field tested and empowers subordinates to better use resources and coordinate efforts at the lowest tactical levels. Pull-down intelligence on demand will be the norm. While technology will be a significant aid in battle command, the constantly changing nature of battle requires the adaptability, judgment, and intuition only the human dimension­the commander­can bring. Human beings input the information, make decisions based upon it, and act upon it.

b. Battlespace. A joint concept, battlespace, is closely associated with the components of battle command. Battlespace is a concept that facilitates the type of innovative approach to warfighting required of leaders in future battles. Our forces will be able to dominate an expanded battlespace. Such domination will be judged by the ability to be more lethal and survivable and operate at a tempo greater than any enemy. We must dominate this battlespace in war with a minimum number of our own troops in it. In OOTW, however, more land forces will be required to exercise population control or exercise control over terrain. The trend in combat is toward fewer soldiers in a given battlespace; the trend in OOTW is for it to be manpower-intensive. Since battlespace is not confined by time, boundaries, graphics, countermeasures, or other physical constraints, it offers the commander a means to look at conditions beyond his traditionally defined area of operations that may affect or influence events within that area.

(1) Battlespace involves the ability to visualize the area of operations and the way that forces interact, be it in combat or in a humanitarian relief mission. The size, shape, and density of a unit's battlespace are variable and influenced by mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time available (METT-T). The spatial expansion of the future joint battlespace will result in service-specific functional battlespaces intersecting and overlapping. This conceptual construct of battlespace will give future joint commanders a coherent vision of a fully integrated, full-dimensional battlespace and permit simultaneous engagement of targets by a greater variety of joint warfighting systems. In terms of visualizing an area of operations and how forces or other elements interact, battlespace has equal utility in OOTW.

(2) In the physical sense, battlespace is that volume determined by the maximum capabilities of a unit to acquire and engage the enemy­capabilities that will be greatly expanded by future technology. As addressed in the previous chapter, technical improvements in maneuver weapons systems, such as advanced optics, increased ranges, and digital electronics, will have a dramatic impact on tactical battlespace. Advancements in stealth, metallurgy, propulsion, and suspension technology will result in faster, lighter, more lethal, and more survivable fighting systems. Advancements in camouflage, lightweight communications devices, and soldier protection will fully leverage individual soldier capabilities.

(3) Well-equipped, future Army maneuver forces­operating at an operational tempo controlled by the commander within a given battlespace­will use an expanded array of joint weapons systems to engage enemy forces at greater distances with assured accuracy. Based on enhanced situational awareness through ABCS, the operating tempo of these forces will be such that they will be able to outpace any adversary in both mounted and dismounted warfighting environments.

(4) Information operations influence battlespace by providing the commander the means required to better visualize the battlespace while blinding or shaping an opposing commander's vision. Battlespace then becomes a function of the commander's ability to use information provided by the command system previously described and employ his warfighting systems to achieve the necessary balance to ensure success.

(5) Expanded battlespace will also allow simultaneous engagement by a variety of joint warfighting systems available to the future task force commander. Expansion of battlespace to gain an advantage such as lethal reach over enemy forces will be essential to establishing maneuver force overmatch when maneuver alone, or disabling measures, cannot accomplish the mission. Consistent with the idea of an increasingly empty battlespace, this expansion will be achieved through dramatic improvements in manned and unmanned target-acquisition systems and precision direct- and indirect-fire capabilities. While fires are not automatically necessary to win, forces must be capable of using fires to gain the advantage.

(6) Battlespace expansion will achieve three distinct (not necessarily sequential) advantages over the enemy:

(a) By a variety of reconnaissance means, identify, disrupt, or destroy enemy forces before they can effectively engage friendly forces.

(b) Reduce friendly force vulnerability by increasing the dispersion and numbers of the friendly force. Physically mass only when absolutely necessary, but be capable of doing so rapidly and in varying combinations of combat, combat support, and combat service support.

(c) Conduct maneuver by use of both fires and rapid physical mass and dispersion of ground forces to sense and dominate a greater battlespace and achieve a staying power effect (control) only possible with land forces.

(7) Overmatches in the elements of combat power­maneuver, firepower, protection, leadership, and, ultimately, information­will prove essential to maintaining the edge against potential adversaries.

(a) Army units operating in both mounted and dismounted battlespace will enjoy maneuver force overmatch. This battlespace domination will be achieved through high-tempo, all-weather, air-land-sea continuous operations. Dismounted force mobility and maneuver improvements will be achieved by lightening the soldier's load, increasing his ability to overcome terrain and obstacle restrictions, optimizing the performance of his equipment, and improving his physiology. For mounted forces, improvements will be achieved through increased mobility of platforms, lethality of weapons, survivability of systems, and streamlining of the logistical support system necessary to maintain heavy-force, operational tempo and capabilities.

(b) Firepower of forces operating throughout the depth of battlespace will include both direct and, in the future, indirect precision fires. Both must overmatch enemy capabilities in range, target acquisition, accuracy, and lethal punch. Improved locating devices and digitized sensor-to-shooter linkages will greatly improve the accuracy and responsiveness of close fire support systems.

(c) Maneuver force protection is a critical element in maintaining dominance of battlespace. Key to force protection is finding the enemy and determining his capabilities. Future Army forces must be capable of conducting effective security operations. The use of improved reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) sensors and unmanned vehicles will aid in this objective. Active counter-RSTA measures may include enhanced armor or ballistic protection, deception techniques, and fighting position enhancements for dismounted soldiers, weapons systems, and logistics sites. Passive force protection capabilities will include low-observable technology, improved electronic countermeasures, and multispectral camouflage. Passive protection systems and actions must also be sought to protect forces operating within a given battlespace where the use of weapons of mass destruction is likely.

c. Depth and Simultaneous Attack. The domination of extended battlespace will require agile and robust deep and simultaneous attack capabilities. As stated earlier, advances in this dynamic may drive a reassessment of the traditional relationship between fire and maneuver. Combining the concepts of deep operations and simultaneous attack using both lethal and nonlethal means creates a dynamic capability to extend the battlespace in space, time, and purpose; to reduce, if not entirely eliminate, the time and need to shape the battlespace; to facilitate full-dimensional attack of an enemy center of gravity; and to accelerate his defeat. Simply stated, depth and simultaneous attack will enable the commander to directly influence the enemy throughout the width, height, and depth of his battlespace to stun, then rapidly defeat an enemy. We saw indications of these possibilities in both Just Cause and Desert Storm. By massing the effects of long- and short-range area and precision fires, integrating information operations designed to blind, demoralize, and deafen the enemy, concurrent with rapid combined arms maneuver, ground and from the air, a larger and less agile enemy force can be quickly and decisively defeated. Although these attacks may not be simultaneous in application from the enemy's perspective, they will appear seamless and nearly simultaneous in effect.

(1) Using the ABCS to integrate battlefield information, twenty-first century commanders will have the capability to see the entire battlefield in depth, identify key targets­particularly moving and short-dwell targets­and attack with a wide choice of joint, as well as Army systems, whenever and wherever the commander desires. Depth and simultaneous attack means will vary greatly. They will include air, Army aviation and ground maneuver units, joint precision fires, psychological operations, information operations, and employment of special operations forces. These various means of attack, and others, will be horizontally and vertically integrated by a fully digitized joint and combined arms target-acquisition, hand-off, and strike system­a component network of ABCS.

(2) Along with battle command and battlespace, successful depth and simultaneous attack increases demands on intelligence systems, to include human intelligence capabilities. Long-endurance, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with high-resolution video, filmless cameras, and follow-on generation, forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) technology will be employed at the lowest tactical levels. These multipackage UAVs will be linked to a variety of other sensors and ground stations. Indeed, networks of distributed, multipurpose sensors will populate future battlefields. These sensors will locate, identify, and track enemy formations with a high degree of accuracy. Selected sensor systems, as well as UAVs, will serve as weapons platforms capable of sensing, locating, identifying, and attacking targets and afterward assessing damage. All acquisition systems, including maneuver and command platforms, will have sensor-to-shooter fusion links to direct, indirect, and joint attack assets. These future reconnaissance and active and passive target-acquisition and surveillance systems will provide commanders continuous wide-area battlefield observation at greater ranges, prevent fratricide, and provide joint battle damage assessments.

(3) A key component of depth and simultaneous attack will be measures taken to win the information war. These measures will include the establishment of electromagnetic-spectrum supremacy through nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse generators, space-based information denial systems, and computer viruses. Electronic warfare preparations will normally precede, but may take place concurrent with, ground and air operations. Command and control warfare (C2W) may replace air supremacy as the essential first step in operations. Television and other communications media provide means to defend or undermine the will of entire populations. Another method of attack will be to access the enemy battlefield computer systems and manipulate information. Through successful information operations, adversaries will be forced to exercise command through nineteenth century means, while US forces operate state-of-the-art, twenty-first century systems.

(4) Joint and multinational precision-strike actions of simultaneous attacks in-depth will be planned to achieve specific operational and tactical objectives. Success will require an absolute unity of effort among all arms and service components and a clear focus of attacks to lead to the defeat of the enemy strategic center of gravity. In essence, the joint force commander will have to both optimize and synchronize the capabilities of each service to effectively execute depth and simultaneous attack. This will require a reexamination of the current joint fire support coordination paradigm.

(5) Depth and simultaneous attack will be a key characteristic of future American military operations. These operations will redefine the current ideas of deep, close, and rear. The ultimate goal of depth and simultaneous attack is to overload the enemy's ability to cope by presenting an overwhelming number of actions throughout the depth of the battlefield. The measure of success in executing depth and simultaneous attack will be determined by our efforts to leverage emerging technology in four general categories: battlespace preparation, synchronization, simultaneous attack execution, and force protection. Successful force protection will prove essential. Tactical and theater missile defense against enemy long-, medium-, and short-range rockets and ballistic missiles must be developed. Effective air defense against cruise missiles, UAVs, and RPVs must also be pursued, and improved measures to prevent fratricide must be developed.

(6) Depth and simultaneous attack in concept also applies to military OOTW. Whether the object is control of land or populations or rapid reestablishment of infrastructure following a natural disaster, US or combined forces must establish that control simultaneously and throughout the entire operational space. Many times sequential operations permit too much time for forces opposed to peacekeeping and cause unneeded continued suffering in disaster relief operations. Thus, OOTW must also ascribe to this concept of simultaneity.

d. Early Entry. This is one of the battle dynamics where change is most dramatic where the relevance of the force-projection Army to the current and near future strategic environment is most notable. Army early entry forces will confront a wide range of potential missions, many of which will be joint, multinational, and interagency. Innovative combinations of forces will be required to meet the challenges associated with early entry operations. Early entry operations will be conducted by forces that are not necessarily light or heavy, but tailored to METT-T in order to create the best possible capabilities-based force to meet the needs of any given contingency. The early entry force may not be comprised solely of active component forces. It will likely have a sizeable reserve component and a civilian contingent, especially in OOTW. The aim of early entry forces must be, when possible, simultaneous application of force or control throughout the operational area. If not possible, and if forced initially into other circumstances, the aim should continue to be rapid and simultaneous application of force or control as quickly as possible.

(1) Early entry operations will occur across the wide range of military operations peacemaking, worldwide humanitarian assistance, civil support, unconventional warfare, forcible entry, and even heavy battle. These operations may be of short duration or may be the foundations for extended, protracted operations.

(2) The actions by an early entry commander may be tactical on the ground but have strategic and international repercussions. Success in early entry will prove critical. It will establish American military credibility. As a result, worldwide media coverage and instantaneous communications can make even small-unit, early entry actions strategically significant. Failure in early entry operations will have major strategic consequences for follow-on military action or prevent action altogether.

(3) Actions during predeployment will be critical to success. The early entry commander will be able to see the battlefield, using information gathered from national systems, HUMINT, and other sources linked directly to the tactical operations center. As part of his battlefield preparation, he will make force-tailoring decisions.

(4) Prior to deployment, the commander will train through interactive simulation and live modes. Simulation will permit units at different locations to fight together through a combination of virtual, constructive and live simulations in a mission- planning rehearsal system. Various mission planning software already exists that allows planners to look at terrain from various heights and directions and plan accordingly. Essential to this capability is the requirement to have comprehensive and updated terrain data bases, such as the Defense Mapping Agency is creating on CD-ROM. Based on multispectral imagery, accurate weather, and current intelligence information, soldiers will be able to use simulations to rehearse operations repeatedly before they are actually called upon to perform them. Information technology will provide deploying units access to the latest intelligence and information in the theater of operations to continue active involvement in planning. En route simulations capabilities will enable the force to continue training and conduct rehearsals.

(5) The Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) has set goals for the deployment of forces. Early entry forces will meet these goals by using modernized air and sealift assets. The introduction of the C-17 and the new family of large, medium- speed, roll-on/roll-off ships will dramatically improve Army capabilities to meet future strategic mobility requirements. Other initiatives will result in smaller, but more lethal and survivable organizations and lighter equipment, due to advances in composite materials research. These efforts, along with the employment of pre-positioning afloat equipment, the self-deployment of Army aviation assets, the pre-positioning of support maintenance facilities, split-based logistics and intelligence, and the benefits of total asset visibility, will also reduce lift requirements. This rapid force projection to an objective area of an early entry force or forces is gained by synergy of deception and surprise, anticipation, rapid tailoring of forces, rapid sea and air movement, and skillful pre- positioning.

(6) Early entry forces will often face an enemy that attempts to deny the buildup of overwhelming combat power and may be either close to water or far inland. The early entry force must therefore be prepared to fight its way in or, soon after arrival, expand its battlespace, take advantage of its own inherent strengths (lethality, survivability, control of operational tempo), as well as those of other services, and win quickly or rapidly establish control.

e. Combat Service Support. Rapid force projection from platforms in CONUS or forward-presence bases, extended lines of communication, and potential forcible entry into logistically bare-based areas of operations require continual evolution from 1993 doctrine. The varied demands of war and OOTW require the development of a logistics system that is versatile, deployable, and expansible. Modular units in both active and reserve components will allow rapid force logistics tailoring. This future logistics system must be as capable as the joint and multinational forces, to include the special operations forces that it will support, especially since Army CSS and CS units are usually the major theater land force operators in war and OOTW. Creation of this new CSS system necessitates weaving the current strategic, operational, and tactical levels of logistics into a seamless continuum. This seamless concept must extend throughout the total force and take into consideration the integration and application of civilians and the reserve components.

(1) In addition to logistics power-projection missions, the Army will be increasingly called upon to perform nontraditional support missions, both foreign and domestic. Supporting these missions will require an unprecedented versatility, a resiliency not historically found in Army CSS units, and a fundamentally different approach to resourcing logistics force structure, materiel, and training.

(2) As in the past, the primary purpose of logistics will be to support mobilization, deployment, reception and movement, sustainment, reconstitution, redeployment, and demobilization of military forces across the full range of military operations. Army logistics will play a vital role in all these levels of operations­strategic, operational, and tactical. Despite proliferation of high-technology systems, the orientation of logistics will remain on soldiers.

(3) Strategic logistics will, more than ever, represent a subset of national power because it includes the nation's industrial base and its link to military forces. The strategic level will remain the purview of DOD, the individual services, and non-DOD governmental agencies, with an unprecedented level of support from the private sector. Reduced resources for DOD logistics and applications of electronic management and information systems will necessitate the formation of strategic alliances between Army logistics mechanisms and civilian industry. The civil sector will assume more responsibility for functions such as warehousing, maintenance, and materiel management than they have in the past. These forged links between the sustainment base and the Army will negate the need for Army-managed stockpiles and allow a true producer-to-foxhole sustainment system. Further, the Army will increasingly adapt, with little or no change, the successful techniques, procedures, and materiel innovations of the commercial sector to meet its logistical support requirements.

(4) Operational logistics ties tactical requirements to strategic capabilities in order to accomplish operational plans. It encompasses support required to sustain joint and/or multinational campaigns and other military activities within an area of responsibility. Military units, augmented by an expanded number of civilians, contractor personnel, and available host nation resources, will comprise the future organizational structure of elements found at this level. The primary focus of the operational logistician will be on reception, discharge, onward movement of forces, positioning of facilities, materiel management, movement control, distribution, reconstitution, and redeployment.

(a) A flexible, theater-level sustainment support activity, called the logistics support element (LSE), may be deployed into the operational areas to enhance Army logistical capabilities. The organization will consist of highly skilled and properly equipped DOD/DA civilian technicians, private-sector contractors, and elements of active Army and reserve components.

(b) An objective area's infrastructure will be a major consideration in future operations. An immature, bare-based, or nonexistent, infrastructure will, more often than not, be in areas where Army logisticians will be called upon to operate. This reality will be a key factor in the development of logistics support for future operations. A concerted effort must be used to identify those missions and functions that can be satisfied by the private sector, versus military forces, when operating in these areas. The future Army cannot afford to use infantrymen as longshoremen. Capitalizing on available host nation support will be a major means of resolving support shortfalls without placing additional demands for deployment of additional logistics units. Prenegotiated host nation support agreements will be imperative.

(5) Tactical logistics is the synchronization of all logistics activities required to sustain soldiers and their systems. Military units organic to the deployed tactical force will make up the bulk of the logistics organization at this level. However, the organization may include some support from DOD civilians and civilian contractors. The focus of the tactical logistician is on the logistics sinews of manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining the soldier and his equipment. Tactical logistics will continue to be one of the keys to more rapid tempo of operations. Anticipation, long a goal of logisticians, can be aided by telemetry applied to both soldiers and equipment. To realize more rapid tempo, logisticians must look to increased asset visibility and means and methods to anticipate.

(a) During preparation and planning for contingency operations, the most difficult challenge for logisticians will be determining the appropriate mix of active, reserve component, DOD civilian, contractor, and host nation support elements to support the force. Modular logistical organizations will help the tactical logistician achieve the appropriate mix. But, modularity to the extreme can be dysfunctional to overall logistics force cohesion and effectiveness. An increased presence of contractors and host nation support elements will be used to minimize deficiencies in future support operations.

(b) The key to proper execution of early entry logistics operations is the phasing of these elements into the theater of operations. Commanders and planners will create support structures to meet the initial logistics needs of the deploying force. These support forces must be sufficiently flexible and robust to allow support across the full range of military operations.

f. Emergence of Force XXI. Mastery of the many changes associated with the five battle dynamics described herein­principal among them battle command will result in the emergence of Force XXI, a twenty-first century United States Army fully prepared to meet the challenges of the future. Force XXI will be the world's preeminent joint land fighting force, and the way it fights will define the nature of post-Industrial Age warfare. See Figure 3-3.

3-3. Force XXI Operations.

a. Background.

(1) The remainder of this chapter discusses actual Force XXI Operations, attempting to envision the unifying concept and battle dynamics in actions in war and OOTW. A dynamic tension always exists between technology and doctrine and between strategy and doctrine; they shape one another.

Figure 3-3

Joint Land Operations in the Information Age

(a) In the case of technology and doctrine, military future architects are aware of two historical trends. The first is that technology often is applied first to the commercial sector, followed at some later time into military use. With few exceptions, this has been the case for land warfare in the twentieth century, even if not the case in air and naval warfare developments. Second, technology often influences much more rapidly CS and CSS than combat arms. Application of technology from the American Civil War through World War II much more rapidly changed CS and CSS doctrine than it did combat arms. Given that fact, and that the ultimate objectives of military operations do not greatly change, one can see the natural evolution of doctrine toward Force XXI Operations.

(b) The interaction between strategy and doctrine is also instructive. Given a relatively prescriptive Cold War strategy related to a single, focused threat, our doctrine developed the same way. Thus, when facing the Warsaw Pact, the U.S. Army developed the Active Defense (the 1976 FM 100-5) which reflected a U.S. force outnumbered and a force on the way to being technically inferior qualitatively on an armor-dominated European battlefield. Later AirLand Battle (FM 100-5, 1982 and 1986) was developed, still with U.S. forces being outnumbered but no longer technically inferior because of procurement of new land systems. AirLand Battle controlled the tempo of operations with a battlefield framework suited to Central Europe and the echeloned attack of soviet or soviet-style forces. AirLand Battle delineated and clarified the levels of war, emphasized close concerted operations of airpower and ground forces, balanced offense and defense, and highlighted the synchronization of close, deep and rear. Still threat-based and focused on Central European conflict, AirLand Battle used a relatively prescriptive, fixed framework to focus combat power. It worked.

(c) As our strategy has evolved from that relatively prescriptive era, so has our doctrine. Thus, our 1993 operations doctrine (FM 100-5) contains significant changes. Reflecting the multipolar world, recent combat, and technological advances, doctrine was developed for a force-projection Army. It is much less prescriptive, relying on principles to be applied by the art of battle command to varying strategic scenarios vice the Cold War scenario of Central Europe. Army operations expanded into wider joint and combined integration and also included OOTW. This capabilities- and principles- based doctrine described how to think about operations with a variety of possible battlespace frameworks, to include simultaneous rather than sequential deep and close operations. It also reflected the blurring of levels of war, the beginnings of information operations, and the mix of war and OOTW in the same theater. This introduced full- dimensional operations. See Figure 3-4.

(d) This next evolution of doctrine assumes there will not be return to the prescriptive strategic framework forged against a single threat but rather a strategy of principles to be applied in given circumstances. Thus this next evolution of doctrine will continue the evolution of full-dimensional operations into Force XXI Operations, as the increasing impact of Information Age technologies is combined with quality soldiers and leaders in the U.S. Army. Reflecting advances in weapons and information technology, this concept achieves force coherence through shared knowledge. With a shared common and timely perception of the battlespace, a relatively unconstrained framework, a digital framework, will organize the battlefield and control of operational tempo.

b. Characteristics.

(1) The general and seamless pattern of future knowledge-based land warfare under this joint vision will be mission analysis and force tailoring, reconnaissance, decisive action, and sustained operations or recovery. Although listed separately and sequentially, these actions will most often occur simultaneously, and, at the operational level, appear seamless. Operational activities associated with these actions include:

(a) Mission analysis and tailoring of forces for force projection to include lift and pre-positioned equipment considerations.

(b) Reconnaissance and verification of operational area, to include enemy or other forces in AOR, surprise, and deception.

(c) Decisive action by simultaneous attack or control throughout the AOR by use of fires and air, naval, and land forces.

(d) Sustain operations to achieve strategic aims or recover to move to another theater.

Figures 3-4

Battlefield Frameworks

(2) During the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the Army will be at the emerging edge of knowledge-based land warfare. Regardless of size, few, if any, armies will be able to equal American military capabilities. As they evolve, Force XXI Operations will prove as decisive as the blitzkrieg of early World War II. But, as with that warfighting concept, adversaries will seek the means to defeat these types of future operations. Therefore, the United States military must prepare for the inevitable response. One response would be to preclude these operations from ever occurring, either through nuclear deterrence, strategic psychological warfare design to influence national will, information operations, preemptive strike, or strategic and operational interdiction of critical lines of communications.

(3) In developing Force XXI capabilities, one must be mindful of vulnerabilities. The spread of ballistic missile technology, both strategic and theater, also poses a serious threat to these operations. Weapons of mass destruction delivered by a variety of methods will remain an area of high interest well into the next century. Possible threats to our information systems as well as strategic lines of communication and key nodes in the theater of operations and, obviously, to CONUS are other areas.

c. Tempo. In the global information network and where the time from crisis exposure to action underway and crisis resolution will continue to be compressed, tempo will grow in importance. In effect, when military force or forces are the principal option of choice, the hourglass will be turned over and the rate at which sand flows to the bottom will be conditioned by any number of factors. The rate of flow is conditioned by strategy, which directly affects the tempo of military operations. Thus, battlespace operations will be deliberately designed to control operational tempo, which will be affected by both external strategic factors as well as internal military factors. Tempo is more than speed; it is adjustment in rate of operations relative to battle circumstance and assessment relative to enemy capability to sense and react. Tempo is important in both war and OOTW.

(1) Better intelligence, shared among all elements and moved or retrieved rapidly on demand, will allow commanders to control and vary that tempo based on superior knowledge of friendly situation/location, enemy situation/location, and events shaping the overall battlespace. Improved logistics asset visibility will also affect tempo. In addition, possible uses of telemetry with data compiled rapidly will aid future logisticians in anticipating logistics requirements for soldiers and equipment. Victory in war will go to the force able to string together a series of tactical victories faster than the enemy can respond. Timing-pulses of maneuver, pulses of logistics, pulses of fire-and speed will achieve maneuver, and, if necessary, firepower dominance. Superior timing and speed, controlled by shared information, will allow commanders to physically mass forces only when necessary. Commanders with the information and capability to shape all dimensions of the battlespace can organize and control forces with the speed and timing to win. In OOTW, the same logic/methods, with much less, or no use of fires, applies. Potential offered by information operations in the future may well be the ability to orchestrate apparent chaos on the battlefield­overwhelmingly confusing to the enemy­with patterns understood by the US commander and coalition partners.

(2) This manner of conducting joint land operations does not rely for its existence solely upon future technologies. Force XXI Operations are possible with existing technologies; we are simply not yet sufficiently tactically adaptable nor have we changed some battle processes to take full advantage of such versatility. Yet, trends in recent operations in Somalia and Macedonia, in addition to rapid force tailoring in Just Cause and Desert Storm, indicate we have begun. Our weapons can strike anywhere in our battlespace, but we cannot fully control them or sense their effects. Intelligence systems can provide detailed images and SOF can supply critical HUMINT. Yet, the full synchronization of all this capability is not realized. Evolving information technologies will almost undoubtedly unlock the full potential of Force XXI Operations, but we must begin now to change the way we think and organize staffs, information flow, procedures, and possibly organizations. Existing and evolving information technologies will support and shape the evolution of procedures and processes. This ongoing doctrinal development will place the Army in the lead of the revolution in military affairs.

(3) Future American land combat operations­Force XXI Operations­will be deliberately designed to control­maintain, accelerate, or moderate as necessary­the pace of battlefield events. The intent is that these dynamic combat operations take place over the shortest feasible time at least cost, to both friendly forces, enemy forces and neutrals. Made possible in part by the new Army Battle Command System (ABCS) in the hands of a new generation of leaders adept in the art of command, these fast-moving operations will occur throughout the operational width, depth, and height of a given battlespace, using a wide variety of means­surface, space, sea, air, electronic, informational, psychological, and special operations.

(a) Commanding under these conditions will require voluminous information. Most importantly, it will require intelligent processing and distribution of the critical data. This is an important link in information operations between the technology and the human dimension.

(b) We must look at reducing manpower by increasing automation in areas that deal with rations, fuel, and other housekeeping staff functions. We must not reduce staffs solely for the sake of reducing them. The assimilation of data and information and application of judgment for key decisions will continue to require competent teams assisting commanders. Clearly, though, future automated information operations promise a capability to operate with unprecedented control in routine staff formations, allowing commanders and staff to focus on more complex, integrative tasks.

(4) Lethality and pace of future operations will result in a reliance on artificial intelligence systems, robotic systems, automated weapons, and computer-operated C2 links, such as those described herein, for two key reasons. First, automated systems will provide the speed, precision, and integration in execution and reaction required on future battlespaces. Second, automated systems support the principle of minimizing friendly casualties by reducing soldier exposure. Decision-making systems for routine battlespace functions will operate in accordance with rapidly reconfigurable sets of predetermined commanders' decision-making criteria. When these decision parameters are exceeded, this criteria can be quickly changed, such as the TACFIRE commanders' criteria capability offers now. Commanders can override automated decisions based on the concept of command negation. Computerized systems will be the tools by which hierarchical and internetted command processes are integrated. Computerized decision aids should reduce workload, and thus the size of staffs, by performing routine functions related to terrain management in assembly areas, road marches, routine resupply, reporting, etc. More advanced decision aids, as well as procedural changes, will be needed for terrain management and clearance of fires in combat situations.

d. Joint and Multinational Operations. Facilitated by improvements described in the battle dynamics, early twenty-first century American land operations will be fully integrated, completely joint, and, most often, multinational. In future wars or in OOTW, the connection between the three classic levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical, will appear seamless because it will consist of full-dimensional operations throughout the width, depth, and height of a given theater of operations. The goal is that these operations be conducted under conditions where US forces, supported by our coalition partners, enjoy a qualitative technical, training, leadership, and, most importantly, information edge.

(1) Throughout the full range of military operations, under both defensive and offensive conditions, regardless of environment, future American operations will induce massive systemic shock on an enemy. These operations will be meant to force the loss or deny the enemy any opportunity to take the initiative. Full-dimensional, joint, and often multinational Force XXI Operations will systematically attack opposing force cohesion and destroy the moral will to continue the opposition.

(2) As previously stated, future wars fought and OOTW conducted by the United States will involve the simultaneous and full-dimensional application of all elements of military power. Future operations will capitalize on the concentration of joint and combined arms effects, combined when necessary with the actual physical massing of forces. These effects will be directed toward the precision attack of critical information management nodes, key strategic assets, and enemy fighting formations. Future operations will make information operations the initial focus of operations, much like the attainment of air superiority is now. Effective information operations will make battlespace transparent to us and opaque to our opponents.

(3) The spatially extended pulse of lethal and nonlethal striking power, a glimpse of which was offered in Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm, will overwhelm enemy commanders' capacity to react. When viewed from the receiving end, once unleashed, early twenty-first century American military operations will appear as one seamless, fully synchronized, and multifaceted strike, involving all elements of American and coalition military power.

(4) Army forces will work extensively with forces of other nations in conducting future OOTW such as peacekeeping, nation building, and relief operations. These operations will highlight the significant technical mismatch between the Force XXI Army and coalition partners.

(a) Planning for each such operation must take these capability differentials into account immediately and make necessary adjustments in force composition.

(b) American soldiers will be able to work more effectively than in the past due to improved Army liaison and language capabilities; expanded training, exercise, and professional education programs; and exchanges with foreign armies. The number and variety of Army foreign language linguists will need to increase. Greater use of automated translation software for written communications will also be employed.

(c) In the area of liaison, expanded training and professional education, aided by CD-ROM-based liaison packages, must improve liaison team understanding of partner-army organization, equipment, and doctrine or civil agency procedures. OOTW will require liaison with myriad military and civilian partners. Combat will require liaison teams with significant technical capabilities to ensure full sharing of information necessary to fully utilize each participant's capabilities.

e. Control. Land forces are uniquely capable of control of populations and land areas as strategic objectives direct. Land forces bring staying power and commitment to a conflict or OOTW situation­unmistakable in its communication of intent to adversaries. In a strategic environment without a single pervasive threat, the utility of land forces for control to gain strategic aims increases. Control is an end state. It is the aim of an operation and will often dictate tempo; combinations of joint, combined, and interagency forces; and sequential or simultaneous combinations of characteristics of Force XXI Operations. More hazardous than missions of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief will be missions that may at times resemble or require elements of combat operations, including unconventional operations, peace enforcement, stability operations, and conflict containment. The Army must be able to perform these types of missions as well as those involved in more conventional, traditional conflicts to gain control of land or populations. Desert Storm required destruction of the Iraqi Army in the Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO) to regain control of Kuwait. Provide Comfort required control of an area and population to accomplish humanitarian operations.

(1) Expanded unconventional operations­strikes and raids­conducted during times of conflict will challenge the Army's Special Forces and Rangers, who will continue to form the bulk of the nation's special operations forces.

(2) Other Army forces, primarily light, but occasionally heavy, will be called upon to conduct civil disturbance, counterdrug, peacekeeping, and more hazardous peace-enforcement and counterinsurgency operations. As recent events have shown, the American people are logically less prone to accept casualties in these operations than they are during war.

(3) Survival technologies that assist and protect United States forces conducting operations, especially in constrained environments such as jungle and urban areas and in OOTW situations, will greatly increase the effectiveness of United States Army forces. Many of the technologies discussed herein apply directly to survival in these types of operations, including improved UAVs, sensors, and robotics. See Figure 3-5.

This figure depicts remote sensors and long-endurance, multicapable RPVs to support counterdrug operations in a jungle environment. The platoon leader-controlled RPV establishes an IFF protective zone over the platoon, which is surrounded by a larger detection zone. The RPV uses TV, FLIR, and sensor relays to determine enemy activity in the objective area. It also has a direct sensor-to-shooter link to fire support.

Figure 3-5

Operations with Long-Endurance, Multicapable, Remotely Piloted Vehicles

(4) The Army will also study the development and employment of nonlethal, noncrippling, temporarily disabling weapons and high-technology, crowd-dispersal systems for operating in OOTW environments and urban or village environments where civilian losses and risk of collateral damage are significant.

(5) Technology offers much, but American soldiers of the future, as in the past, will be called upon to be flexible and versatile. They will be counted upon to display mental agility and American ingenuity as they seek alternative methods, often low- technology, to cope with the circumstances that surround them. For example, jamming communication may require beating oil drums to interfere with jungle telegraphs­a primitive but effective means of communicating during recent operations involving a third-world adversary.

3-4. Summary.

In summary, this vision of the future goes far beyond materiel solutions to future challenges. Indeed, this vision places far greater demands upon soldiers and leaders than any previous operational vision did. It is a concept with five clear characteristics that gain operational capabilities through five battle dynamics. These operational capabilities then translate into actual Force XXI Operations that in the projected future strategic environment will have clear tactical patterns, emphasize tempo, be joint and multinational, and usually have control as their aim. Knowledge-based operations call for great change in doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldiers. But throughout these changes, the nature of land combat demands that the Army maintain its soldier focus. Simply stated, our future Army will continue to recognize the soldier as its greatest capability and build our future operational concept around quality soldiers and leaders.

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